Elections as an Institutional Mechanism to Mitigate Political Conflict.

Abstract

This study examines general elections in Indonesia as institutional mechanisms for managing and resolving political conflict within a democratic framework. Political conflict is understood as an inherent feature of plural societies, requiring structured and legitimate channels to prevent escalation into violence. Using a qualitative approach, this research analyzes the 2024 General Election by integrating democratic theory, legal analysis, and empirical observations. The study explores how electoral institutions transform political rivalry into regulated competition through formal procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms, and constitutional adjudication. The findings indicate that Indonesia’s electoral system has provided legal avenues for resolving both process and result disputes through institutions such as the Election Supervisory Agency, administrative courts, and the Constitutional Court. However, the effectiveness of elections as conflict-management instruments remains constrained by administrative irregularities, ethical violations, money politics, digital system errors, and limited public trust. These challenges reveal a persistent gap between normative legal ideals and empirical realities. The study argues that elections can function effectively as mechanisms of political conflict resolution only when supported by strong institutional independence, procedural transparency, credible law enforcement, and inclusive political participation. Strengthening electoral governance is therefore essential for sustaining democratic stability, political legitimacy, and social cohesion in Indonesia.